Mathieu Deflem
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This is the introduction to Democracy, Governance, and Law, edited by Mathieu Deflem. Vol. 29 of Sociology of Crime, Law, and Deviance, Emerald Publishing, April 2025.
Also available as PDF file.
Please cite as: Deflem, Mathieu. 2025. "Introduction: The Spirit of Democracies." Pp. 1-5 in Democracy, Governance, and Law, edited by M. Deflem. Leeds, UK: Emerald Publishing.
It will not only be today, but it most decidedly is also today, that democracy is much discussed. This oftentimes difficult discourse is, no doubt, a manifestation of democracy itself. As such, it is shown that the foundations of modernity are themselves subject to be questioned. In social-science scholarship and history, the origins and development of democracy have been usefully discussed at least since the groundbreaking work of Moses Israel Finley (1973). It was Finley who reminded us of the roots of contemporary democracy in the political and philosophical structures of Greek antiquity. The question of how we continue to relate to the Greeks is a matter not merely of comparative relevance or historical curiosity but of critical importance to many of the important democratic puzzles of today (see Anagnostopoulos & Santas, 2019). As Finley already acknowledged, such a dialogue goes to the heart of today’s age of democratic engagement in terms of many relevant issues, such as political consensus and dissent, public participation and apathy, the professionalization (and celebrification) of politics, and the reach of free speech and the boundaries of public debate.
The Greek roots of democracy are readily reflected in the word itself as a combination of dêmos (people) and krátos (power). Democracy thus refers to a form of government that relates explicitly to the people subject to its powers. But how this relationship is (and should be) conceived, of course, is open to considerable debate as reflected in differing theoretical perspectives and their philosophical positions. Following a model proposed by Habermas (1992, pp. 287-328), at least three positions can be differentiated (Deflem, 2008, pp. 169-171). One, input theories place a premium on the participation of the electorate so that government should serve the common good of its citizens (the will of the people). This emphasis on the electoral process and voting rights for all corresponds to the republican conception of democracy that seeks to secure the (collective) rights of the republic as the foundation of democratic government. Two, output theories emphasize the efficacy of the polity to govern in such a way that the constitutional and/or innate rights of (individual) citizens are not unduly interfered with. Corresponding to this non-interventionist model of government is the liberal conception of democracy as a form of government that must always secure freedom or liberty. Three, the procedural concept of democracy primarily considers the manner of (open and fair) debate under which democratic achievements are reached and, additionally, remain subject to debate. In line with this pragmatist ideal, a deliberative conception of democracy is defended.
However democracy is conceived, there is a special relation between government and law that sociologists of law and (socio-)legal scholars will be especially equipped to examine. As contemporary scholars, we readily benefit from our classical roots in social and legal philosophy, not least among which is the great work of Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, the all too obvious inspiration for the title of this Introduction. In a stroke of genius and courage, Montesquieu (1748) formulated the central prerequisites of democratic government in the division and separation of power principles. The division of power principle implies that the place of power cannot be unduly centralized but should be spread across the center of power and various intermediate bodies of representation. The now widely instituted principle of the separation of power holds that the exercise of power must be functionally divided, specifically to pass laws (legislative branch), to enforce and administer laws (executive branch), and to interpret and apply laws (judicial branch).
After Montesquieu, other scholars of the classical era further explicated the conditions and dynamics of democracy in more and less explicit ways. Rivaling Montesquieu’s work in terms of impact, the great study by Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Tocqueville 1835/1840) provided a penetrating and insightful analysis of democratic government in the United States. De Tocqueville thereby paid due attention to the role of law in relation to democracy on the new continent, especially pointing out the great discretionary role of judges to interpret and apply –and thereby effectively make– law.
Though not always a central focus, democracy also preoccupied sociologists in the classic and modern eras of the discipline’s development. Among the examples that can be mentioned, Max Weber (1922) conceived of different types of rationalization in terms of the opposition between autocracy and democracy. Substantively, Weber argued, rationalization is legitimated by divine will (autocracy) or the will of the people (democracy), whereas rationalization in formal respects is based on charisma (autocracy) or legality (democracy). Emile Durkheim (1900, 1901) most explicitly discussed democracy in terms of a theory of rights and punishment, specifically arguing for the increasingly horizontal nature of legally guaranteed rights and responsibilities among citizens as democracy unfolds.
In modern sociology, the relative attention for democracy continued on, though not always with much consideration for the role of law and, instead, mostly restricted to analyses of political formations. C. Wright Mills (1956), for instance, developed a theory of power elites in the United States because he saw the existence and unacknowledged force of such elites as a threat to democracy. From a radically different perspective, most of the oeuvre of Talcott Parsons on American society is deeply contextualized by the democratic nature of U.S. government. Parsons thereby also acknowledged the unique qualities of the American legal system in function of democratization and in opposition to the danger of a politicization of law (Parsons, 1978). Building on both the Parsonian and Marxian traditions, Jürgen Habermas’s work has throughout its development over many decades always shown great concern for democracy, especially from a deliberative viewpoints (Habermas, 1992, 1995).
Despite all such intellectual roots and branches, contemporary sociology of law and socio-legal scholarship has generally not paid great explicit attention to democracy. While there are good reasons why democracy is a central theme in political sociology, there can be no rational nor reasonable justification for sociologists to neglect democracy and its relation to modern law. Of course, there are exceptions, not the least in research on criminal policy and criminal justice (e.g., Manza & Uggen, 2006; Simon, 2007; Skolnick, 2002). The chapters in this volume hope to further add to the (socio-)legal debate on democracy, especially in view of the undeniable resurgence of discussions about, not merely in, democracy.
The chapters in this volume are presented in three thematically divided parts, dealing with issues of democracy in relation to, respectively, law and politics, debate and participation, and crime and justice. The chapters of Part I address essential aspects of the relationship between law and politics under conditions of the realities and ideals of democratic government. Scott Cummings opens with a penetrating analysis of the so-called ‘Stop the Steal’ campaign challenging the outcome of the 2020 U.S. Presidential elections. Cummings forcefully argues how law was (mis)used by political leaders to create distrust against the institutions of democracy itself. Pertti Alasuutari focuses on how national parliaments form a global network in which information and ideas are exchanged. He reveals important principles of parliamentary work involving national sovereignty, parliamentary independence, and a sense of the common good. Next, Terrence Ting-Yen Chen examines the origins of Taiwan’s open government policies. Based on interviews, Chen finds that the promotion of digital democracy in Taiwan originates from complex origins and cannot be simply understood as an increase in participatory democracy. Turning to Indonesia, Rahardhika Utama studies practices of corruption in relation to the realization of democratic ideals. Utama argues that the move towards greater democracy increases corruption on the basis of a model of bureaucratic clientelism. Chris Thornhill also unravels a remarkable and unexpected relationship, specifically between constitutional law and military violence. Thornhill’s provocative arguments challenge the usually all too readily accepted normative theories of constitutional legitimacy.
Part II of this book is concerned with democracy in relation to debate and participation rights. Cary Federman studies the tensions inherent in the right peaceably to assemble in democratic societies. Relying on a case study, he shows that lawful assemblies resulting in violence raise important questions in relation to public safety needs versus (rather than with) democratic ideals. Meaghan Stiman analyzes municipal processes of democracy on matters of gun control and coastal land use. Stiman finds that such debates are shaped by a broader set of legal and cultural constraints. Next, Sadie Dempsey examines how open meeting laws limit political participation. Relying on fieldwork in the state of Wisconsin, Dempsey finds that such laws create administrative burdens that make government less responsive to popular input. Turning to a select part of the wider public, Brandii Brunson and Mathieu Deflem [online] provide an analysis of recent activism among Black women athletes in the United States and how they, in a deliberative role, shape public opinion and policies. It is shown that successful women athletes find themselves positioned betwixt and between their status as celebrities and successful stars, on the one hand, and as minorities with respect to both race and gender, on the other. Giulio Calcara and Luke Fisher focus on the right to participation at the international level by examining the institutional politics of the international police organization Interpol, specifically its exclusion of Taiwan as a member. The authors argue that the non-membership of Taiwan violates the constitutional rules of Interpol and contradicts the organization’s principle of neutrality.
The chapters in Part III, finally, address questions concerning crime and (legal and criminal) justice. Christopher Uggen and Emma Lookner provide an analysis of research on felon disenfranchisement and its role in terms of criminological theories in the context of democracies. Provocatively, the authors argue that the link between criminal behavior and the right to vote should be altogether severed. Jordan Burke examines voting trends in Mississippi during Reconstruction era. Applying Charles Tilly’s political violence framework, Burke examines the relationship between political violence and the relative rise and fall of Republican and politics. Karmvir Padda studies a contemporary episode of the relation between violence and democracy by examining the January 6 Capitol riot. Analyzing a dataset of over 1,200 cases, Padda finds that the individuals charged for participating in the violent incident were mostly mid-life adults who were motivated by socio-economic grievances and further fueled by disinformation. Next, Andrew Davis and Teron Nunley study how democratic citizen-driven efforts effected the adoption of punitive criminal policies. Based on a comprehensive quantitative analysis, the authors find that the effects of democratic initiatives to influence criminal policy are subject to differing state-level conditions. In this volume’s last chapter, Stacy Burns and her colleague, the late Mark Peyrot provide an overview of the history of the judicial and legislative regulation of abortion in the United States. The authors reveal a pattern from criminalization to legalization and the subsequent overturning thereof and argue that the legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court is undermined when the Court is seen to disregard precedent.
It is a truism to observe that important issues (and problems) related to democratic aspirations and conditions are at the forefront of many public discussions today. These questions move society in many contexts and with respect to multiple institutions, not least among which are law, government, and the interconnections between them. In the light of the undeniable preoccupation with democracy in our age, scholarship cannot lag behind but, instead, should squarely confront relevant developments and questions. In this respect, the authors contributing to this volume of Sociology of Crime, Law, and Deviance offer important findings and insights. Collectively, the chapters in the book hope to make a timely contribution for anyone interested in democracy both as a worthy ideal and a precarious reality.
REFERENCES
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