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This is a copy of Chapter 9 from The Policing of Terrorism: Organizational and Global Perspectives, by Mathieu Deflem (Routledge, 2010).
Also available as PDF file.
Please cite as: Deflem, Mathieu. 2010. "Undercover Counterterrorism in Israel." Pp. 143-163 in The Policing of Terrorism: Organizational and Global Perspectives, by M. Deflem. New York: Routledge.
It is not difficult to realize that terrorism issues have special relevance to the state of Israel. Given the country’s unique origins and geo-political development, terrorism and counter-terrorism have moved all aspects of Israeli society as in no other place in the world. The policing of terrorism in Israel surely presents a special case in the world of counter-terrorism. For it can be expected that the nature and development of the state of Israel have brought about strong political characteristics of counter-terrorist police work that stand out among comparable law enforcement organizations in other industrialized democratic states.
In view of the complexity of counter-terrorism in Israel and because of the availability of a unique data set, I have in this chapter chosen to focus on the organization and operations of one special Israeli counter-terrorism force: the Yamas units in the Israeli Border Guard Magav, the combat branch of the Israeli Police. Unlike traditional undercover police tactics aimed at a lengthy probe into a criminal network, the operations of Yamas units typically involve surprise hit-and-run raids targeted at taking out terrorists. I will bring out the unique characteristics of Yamas undercover counter-terrorism in the context of the development of the state of Israel and the country’s long-standing experience with terrorism.
This chapter will show that the bureaucratic development of the Israeli police, in general, and of the policing of terrorism in the undercover Yamas units, in particular, is subject to politicization influences related to Israel’s centralized government structure and the state’s precarious international situation. However, the policing of terrorism in Israel is also shaped by organizational developments involving the adoption of professional standards of police expertise. While these organizational developments of counter-terrorism always remain framed within a broader security context geared towards the protection of the nation-state, they also indicate the importance of rationalization processes that police institutions are subject to regardless of differing political conditions.
Bureaucratization and Politicization
Specifying the model of police bureaucratization to the Israeli case, it will cause no surprise to posit the Israeli police in close conjunction with the distinctive nature and development of the state of Israel. It can be hypothesized that the police function in Israel is highly rationalized in a purposive sense as the nation is modernized in political and economic respects. In consequence, the Israeli police may be expected to be organized as a professional force. Additionally, however, Israel’s specific history can also be expected to have brought about a development of police practices and organizational adaptations that relate to the geo-political circumstances of Israel as a Jewish state within an Arab-dominated Middle East. Specifically, periods of upheaval, whether sudden and abrupt or of a more enduring nature, will reveal that the autonomy of Israeli policing also depends on the degree to which the police are controlled by government authorities.
The measure of effective political control on the police is determined by the degree of politicization and centralization of society and the continuity of political power (Gamson and Yuchtman 1977). The Israeli police plays a significant political role but is also subject to a professional police subculture. In terms of the bureaucratization theory, it is therefore important to consider that Israeli police institutions (as other state institutions) will be characterized by a relatively high degree of politicization, because the polity in Israel is not only centralized but also dominant. In this sense, the Israeli police is more than usual connected to the state’s central government. Besides the political dependency of the Israeli police, however, there will also be organizational developments that shape police work on the basis of professional standards. Yet, because of Israel’s geo-political conditions, the bureaucratization tendencies of the police will remain framed within a broader orientation towards the protection of the state.
Policing Israel
The organization of the Israeli police is historically based on the system of the British Mandate of Palestine that existed from 1922 to 1948. Upon the foundation of the state of Israel, the unitary structure of the British system was maintained in the form of an Israeli National Police with a central police headquarters in Jerusalem and regional districts and subdistricts across the territory. The police function in Israel includes crime control, peacekeeping, service functions, traffic control, and internal security. In the course of its history, the Israeli police adjusted in organizational and functional respects to the changing conditions of Israel’s precarious international situation. In 1953, the Border Guard or Magav was set up as a quasi-military gendarmerie force within the Israeli Police in order to combat infiltrators and patrol Israel’s borders. Following the Six Day War of 1967, the expanded territory under Israeli control brought about an expansion of police to the eastern part of Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria (the West Bank), Gaza, Northern Sinai, and the Golan Heights. In the West Bank, police sub-districts were set up that, under military command, were staffed by Israeli and local Arab officers.
Following the Yom Kippur War of 1973, responsibility for internal security within Israel was handed over to the Israeli National Police. In the late 1980s, the Palestinian uprising now known as the First Intifada led to reinforcements of the Israeli police in Jerusalem and other main areas of unrest. The Border Guard and the Civil Guard were then enlisted in the execution of regular police tasks. But when in the early 1990s the Intifada intensified and terrorist bombings increased, the Israeli Police again transferred resources from crime control tasks to internal security functions. The signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 led to the establishment of a sixth Police District for Judea and Samaria. The IDF redeployment in the West Bank transferred internal security duties in the Lakhish Sub-District to the Israeli Police. Currently, the Israeli Police oversees some 25,000 officers, spread over 6 districts, 10 sub-districts, and about 80 police stations. The Israel Police is commanded by a Commissioner of Police, who reports directly to the Minister of Public Security.
The undercover counter-terrorism units of the Yamas (also: Ya’mas; Hebrew: ימ"ס) are organized within the Border Guard Magav. An acronym for Mishmar Ha-Gvul (Hebrew for ‘Frontier Guard’), the Magav is in charge of matters of internal security and terrorism (Brewer et al. 1988). Magav units are employed in main areas of unrest, mainly in Arab-populated areas, near the Israeli state borders, in Jerusalem, and in the West Bank and the Gaza strip. Since the Israeli disengagement from Gaza in 2005, Border Police and IDF forces have withdrawn from the territory now under Palestinian control, but both military and Magav forces still control the Gaza-Israeli border and have occasionally also undertaken operations in Gaza. The Border Guard consists of professional police officers and soldiers redirected from the IDF, some of them as part of the compulsory military service. All Jewish Israeli citizens over the age of 18 are subject to a mandatory service (three years for males, and 18 to 21 months for females).
Since the mid 1970s, both military and civilian forces in Israel have organized counter-terrorism units. In 1974, a civilian counter-terrorism unit was created in the Magav. Later named Unit Yamam, this force became a specialized counter-terror and hostage rescue unit, but it also performs so-called SWAT (special weapons and tactics) duties and engages in undercover police work. Following the outbreak of the Intifada in 1987, several more undercover counter-terrorism units were formed in the IDF, in the Magav, and, in the mid-1990s, in the Israeli Police as well. Besides Unit Yamam, the Magav presently comprises three additional counter-terrorism units: the Matilan, specialized in intelligence gathering and infiltrations interception; the Yamag, a rapid deployment unit for crime and terrorism; and the Yamas, which is in charge of undercover counter-terrorism operations.
Israel Undercover: The Organization of the Yamas
The Yamas units in the Magav are among a group of elite Israeli undercover forces that were originally developed in the military. When the First Intifada broke out in 1987, the IDF created two undercover units: the Sayeret Shimshon unit in the Gaza Strip, and Sayeret Duvdevan (Unit 217) in the West Bank. In 1990, the first Yamas units were established for the same two territories: the Gaza Strip Unit Yamas and the Judea and Samaria Unit Yamas. Both units were formed to deal with terrorist activities coming from these predominantly Palestinian regions, whereby the Gaza strip was of special significance because it was also home to some 8,000 Jewish settlers.
The creation of a third Yamas unit for Israel’s capital city, the Jerusalem Unit Yamas, dates back to 1992, when the Intifada had begun to extend its reach. The unit was initially established as a so-called Samag or reconnaissance force that is oriented at gathering actionable intelligence, but it became an undercover unit in 1995. The special emphasis in the unit’s work is on the eastern (Arab-dominated) side of Jerusalem, which is seen as a particularly dangerous platform for terrorist attacks given the proximity to the western (largely Jewish) parts of the city. The three Yamas units receive the same type of training and equipment, but they lack a unified command. The reason for this decentralized approach is that each relevant region contains Arab populations with their own specific Arabic dialects, customs, and clans, so that each unit has its own unique challenges to effectively infiltrate local culture.
By the very nature of the work undercover counter-terrorism units are involved in, details about the establishment and existence of such units are at times carefully guarded. The Yamas units were classified until August 26, 1992, when an undercover operative was accidentally killed by friendly fire. A day after the incident, a Magav commander appeared on Israeli television to confirm the existence of a unit whose members “dressed as Arabs” and operated “routinely, almost every evening” in the administered territories (quoted in Middle East Watch 1993). In the early 1990s, similar undercover units were also exposed in the Israeli media. In 1991, an IDF officer allowed the existence of military undercover units to be disclosed on Israeli television. A few weeks later, a commander in the Border Police in a radio interview confirmed the deployment of Magav undercover units in the territories and in eastern Jerusalem. In 1994, the undercover units of the Border Police were officially disclosed.
Shortly after the creation of the Jerusalem Unit Yamas, the Israeli Police set up its own undercover force, the Unit Gideonim. At that time, then, there were no less than six counter-terrorist units for three areas: Sayeret Shimshon and Gaza Strip Unit Yamas in Gaza; Sayeret Duvdevan and Judea and Samaria Unit Yamas in the West Bank; and Unit Gideonim and Jerusalem Unit Yamas in Israel’s capital city. In 1994, following the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip, the IDF Unit Shimshon was disbanded, and the Gaza Strip Unit Yamas was relocated in another Magav force. In that period also, after the Oslo Accords of 1993 had established the contours of a Palestinian right of self-governance in Gaza and the West Bank, Magav forces even cooperated with the Palestinian Police Force to conduct joint patrols of areas that were under Israeli-Palestinian mandate (Geva, Herzog, and Haberfeld 2004:1132). However, as the Oslo Accords gradually collapsed in the wake of continued suicide bombings and the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000, all Palestinian-Israeli security collaborations were suspended.
In 2001, the Yamas unit in the Gaza Strip was rebuilt as a separate unit and reinforced. No public information is available on the Gaza Unit’s status since the 2005 disengagement. The official website of the Israeli Police still lists the Gaza territory among the Border Guard’s responsibilities. Since the Hamas (an organization whose charter calls for the destruction of the state of Israel) took control of Gaza in June 2007, it is more than likely that the Border Police and the IDF still maintain a level of operational readiness towards the region. This state of preparedness could be operationalized when on December 27, 2008, Israel undertook a military campaign against Hamas that lasted until January 21, 2009, with continued armed hostilities regularly taking place between Hamas and Israeli forces since then.
Yamas units operate as para-military forces and in their covert appearance resemble military special forces rather than a civilian police unit. The Border Police is under the command of the IDF when they operate in the territories. And, until 1991, the units were even financed by the IDF. Since then, however, the Yamas is self-sufficient in terms of budget and equipment. Although similar to IDF Unit 217 with respect to tactics, the Yamas is distinct in several respects. Whereas most members of Unit 217 are Jewish, the Yamas units predominantly include Arab minorities who have Arabic as their native language. Also, while most members of Unit 217 are mandatory service soldiers, the Yamas operatives have completed their mandatory service. After a limited number of years in the force, once the operatives’ faces may have become too familiar to the people in the communities in which they operate covertly, the officers are either shifted to a different position in the units that involves no undercover work (e.g., snipers) or are moved to another Magav unit.
The recruitment and training programs for the Yamas are very selective. Only about 20%-30% of all applicants to the undercover units are said to eventually become operatives. Based on information provided by Magav command, the initial training involves a very severe seven-day trial period which is particularly oriented at instilling a strong cohesion among the trainees, which is described as ‘gibush,’ a Hebrew term that denotes cohesion and that is especially used in education-related settings but also in political parties, informal groups, and military units (see Katriel and Nesher 1986). Both physical challenges and mental endurance requirements are central to the training. The complete training period lasts one year and includes half a year of basic and advanced infantry training in the Magav or the IDF, two months additional training in a selected unit, and four months of specialized counter-terrorism and undercover training. Training includes instruction in martial arts, Arabic language skills, the use of specialized weaponry (including small Uzis suitable for undercover work), and blending-in exercises in friendly villages and, gradually, in more hostile Arab villages in Israel, in addition to special training programs for snipers, drivers, paramedics, and other specialized functions. Self-control and physical as well as mental stamina are emphasized among the necessary qualities to join the units. In the words of a commander, the candidates need “the correct intuition, courage, and self-confidence. We’re not looking for Rambos; we need people with discipline.”
Members of the Yamas are at least 24 years of age, but typically not much older than 30, and usually unmarried. Since 2003, the units have experimented with integrating a small number of females, but men have always made up the vast majority of operatives. In the world of Yamas undercover operations oriented at gathering intelligence and conducting hit-and-run raids, gender is less relevant as male operatives can dress up as females (aided by the Arab customs of the hijab and burqa).
In terms of its operational objectives, the Yamas is involved in undercover interventions and in intelligence work preparatory to such interventions by Yamas or other undercover forces in the police or military. The units primarily engage in two kinds of interventions. In direct actions, operatives pinpoint terrorists on the basis of intelligence provided by police or military forces. Additionally, undercover operatives infiltrate in crowd control situations and riots, where they seek to seize the leaders and take out armed terrorists. In both types of activities, the Yamas operatives operate covertly, dressed in clothing and otherwise acting in a manner that blends with the local culture. Once they have drawn their weapons and revealed their true nature, they typically put on a black ski mask to cover their faces and/or a baseball cap with the Hebrew word for police so that accompanying uniformed forces can recognize them. Once a target is taken out and armed officers have arrived onto the scene, the Yamas operatives (and their targets in the case of a live capture or snatch-and-grab) quickly disappear in a military vehicle or an unmarked white van.
The Dynamics of Yamas Counter-Terrorism
Modern police organizations are subject to a bureaucratization process that is conditional on societal, especially political, conditions which may lead police agencies to be drawn more closely to the political dictates of their governments. In the case of the Israeli police, and the Yamas in particular, these dual forces are reflected in a number of ways.
Policing National Security
The intimate relation between policing and politics in the Israeli context is most fundamentally revealed in the organization of the police. Organizationally, the political dependency of the Israeli police is reflected in the fact that the Police Commissioner is placed under direct authority of the Minister of Public Security, who represents the government. Israel’s police is thus not organizationally autonomous but subject to control from a highly centralized government (Gamson and Yuchtman 1977). In consequence, the Israeli police lacks many of the distinctive subcultural traits that police institutions in otherwise comparable nations have obtained. The internal control structure in the Israeli police is very tight, and police unions do not exist. Functionally, Israeli police tasks are not only oriented at criminal and service duties but also comprise public security functions directed at protecting the Israeli state. Within the borders of Israel, the security functions of the police are autonomously conducted, and in the territories they are executed under military command. In the case of the Yamas, the security functions in undercover work are dominant.
In consequence of the political dependence of the Israeli police, its relation with the military is an intimate one. In the Israeli context, police and military institutions and functions are interwoven to a considerable degree, especially in areas of work, such as counter-terrorism, that relate more closely to national security concerns. A military style, hierarchical organization, and centralization have been characteristic of the Israeli Police from the start (Herzog 2001). Israel’s non-liberal democracy contributed to the use of military force and extreme security measures (Ben-Dor, Pedahzur, and Hasisi 2003). The Palestinian conflict has additionally shaped the militaristic style of the Israeli police and the definition of police functions in terms of national security, even when on strategic grounds alone this approach has not always proven to be efficient (Pedahzur 2009).
The predominance of military security functions over civilian police tasks is further revealed in the very establishment of Israel’s undercover counter-terrorism units. As mentioned, the first units were set up in the IDF rather than in the National Police or the Border Guard. The major impetus for the formation of the units came from former Israeli Prime Minister and current Minister of Defense Ehud Barak, who at the time was an IDF Major General (1987-1991) and Chief of Staff (1991-1995). Barak had personal experience with undercover operations in April 1973, when he was part of the Sayeret Matkal, a specialized military reconnaissance and counterterrorism team, involved in the killings of PLO members in Lebanon. Part of the so-called ‘Operation Wrath of God,’ the killings took place in retaliation for the 1972 massacre at the Munich Olympic Games. Barak had in the operation masqueraded as a female. Once the military undercover units were established under Barak’s leadership, the Border Police and Israeli National Police quickly followed with their own elite units.
In the execution of undercover activities, the Yamas typically cooperate with other police and military agencies. Military forces and specialized intelligence agencies, specifically the Shin Bet, are most often relied upon to gather the necessary intelligence for Yamas interventions. But Yamas units, in turn, also gather their own intelligence or disseminate it to other agencies. Unlike the collection of actionable intelligence in routine police work for particular criminal cases, intelligence work conducted by the Yamas is not restricted to a particular case, but involves a more routinized information-gathering process, albeit with a view towards action on the part of police or military forces.
The military character of policing in Israel is not a simple unilinear development. In the 1990s, the Israeli police experienced a trend of demilitarization, involving a shift from a security to a crime control focus (Herzog 2001). While both crime and security functions have always been part of the Israeli police mandate, the balance shifted due to a rise in ordinary crimes, such as drug offenses and crime problems related to property and public safety. Local police stations received more autonomy in dealing with such problems, while the image, salary, and working conditions of the civilian police improved, and more women joined the police. Such developments gave the police a more distinct place separate from the military, but ironically also devalued the role of the police in society. In status and prestige, members of the Israeli police are typically held in much lower standing than IDF soldiers (Brewer et al. 1988).
Looking at the implications of the dual police focus on security as well as crime, not much information is available about the nature and extent of Yamas operations. According to a commander, the units are engaged in “several operations per week,” confirming public sources that Yamas operations take place on an almost daily basis. The undercover operations conducted in a recent year by Border Guard, military, and intelligence forces are said to be “100% successful.” But reliable information on the effects of the interventions is difficult to obtain. On only rare and isolated occasions has the Yamas been identified in media and other sources concerning a specific operation. Among the isolated cases of undercover interventions in which the Yamas has publicly been identified is intelligence work during the late 1990s against Yahya Ayyash, one of the chief bomb-makers in Hamas (Katz 2002:186-189). More recently, in the spring of 2007, the Yamas took part in a hit-and-run intervention, killing three members of the Islamic Jihad, including the master-mind behind a suicide bombing in February of that year, in the West Bank city of Jenin.
Providing a more general overview, Yamas units had by 1994 reportedly captured some 70 top members of the Hamas and hundreds of low-level operatives. According to a Magav commander speaking in the media, Border Police units had in 1998 carried out some 770 operations in Judea and Samaria, about one third of which were conducted by undercover units, leading to 180 arrests. By 2007, some 1,500 operations had, according to an unidentified Yamas Unit commander, been conducted by the Yamas since the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000.
The Professionalism of Undercover Counter-Terrorism
Despite the politicization processes on Israeli policing, organizational developments are also at work to account for some of the characteristics of Israel’s counter-terrorism police units. Most noticeable is the strongly expressed sense of commitment to standards of professionalism that is shared among unit operatives and their commanders. As a former intelligence agent explained, security work in the Israeli context always “retains a professional character” because the intelligence community is not subject to the specific changes that take place in the party-political landscape with every election. Among security officials, the expertise of leadership and the professional roles associated with intelligence activities are emphasized to the extent that intelligence information is conceived of as being produced “independently” for the benefit of the political leaders, who are thought of as “customers” or “consumers.” Yamas command likewise stresses that “the unit is independent” and that any decision to engage in an intervention is always “based on professional criteria.”
Though involving extreme measures, undercover counter-terrorism interventions are conceived of by participating police as pro-active measures to prevent attacks by terrorists. As a commander explains, the undercover units “deploy to intercept them before they hit us” (quoted in Katz 2005:21). Also emphasized is the ideal of counter-terrorism work to take out terrorists without hurting any civilians and do everything possible to make sure the interventions are as “clean as possible... to catch the bad guy but not hurt civilians.” A mission that upon its initiation turns out to be too dangerous will be called off, for, in the words of a unit commander, should an operative’s true identity be revealed during an investigation, “they would tear him apart. It’s very dangerous and very problematic.”
The standards of conduct in the Yamas units are reported to be very high, and failure in a mission is said to lead to immediate dismissal from the unit. A commander justifies the high standard by reference to the dangers involved: “A small mistake could result in the death of a comrade...a friend, or someone who is unarmed.” Yet, although the seriousness of the job and the potential dangers involved in the operations are readily apparent to the unit members, there is also a sense of excitement involved in choosing a career in undercover counter-terrorism. In the words of a Yamas operative, the undercover operatives puts on an act as in “reality TV” and is “looking for a challenge... for risk... for self-expression.” Another undercover operative speaks of the “exultation” he felt after his first killing in the field. An accomplished mission is seen by unit operatives as “the biggest satisfaction there is.” Professional mistakes, in contrast, lead to negative feelings. An undercover officer said he felt “lousy” after he had mistakenly killed a person who, acting eccentrically, turned out to be a psychiatric patient who had escaped from an asylum.
In line with professional standards oriented at efficient policing, a strong emphasis is placed in Yamas activities on knowing the operational targets very intimately and studying and submerging oneself in their culture. This deep-cover role is referred to in Hebrew as ‘mistaravim’ (also: mista’arvim or mista’aravim). The central term appearing in the full name of the Yamas, the expression mistaravim (Hebrew: מסתערבים) is the plural form of a neologism that combines the Hebrew terms for ‘disguise’ and ‘Arab’ (Lockard 2002:61). Most sources translate the full name of the Yamas, Yehida Mishtartit Mistaravim, as ‘Counter-Terror Undercover Unit,’ but the Hebrew phrase is more literally to be translated as ‘Unit Undercover Disguised-as-Arabs.’ Mistaravim refers to the skill to appear to be Arab in every possible way, including proficiency in the Arabic language and its dialects, knowledge of the Muslim religion, the Koran, specific ways of dressing and behaving, and an understanding of every relevant aspect of local Arab cultures. The term mistaravim is so central to Israeli undercover practices in the police and the military that the units are sometimes referred to more generically as the mistaravim, under which name they are also well known among Israelis and local Arab and Palestinian populations as well as by critics of Israel’s policies in the territories.
Mistaravim practices have a long history. In the late 1990s it was revealed that the Shin Bet had during the 1950s organized a small group of some ten to twelve mistaravim operatives in order to gather intelligence in Arab villages. The experiment was viewed an error and terminated in 1959, when some operatives had married Arab women and had children with them. Under these conditions, as the founder and commander of the unit later explained, problems arose as operatives had to reveal the truth to their wife and children: “Not only are you not the Arab nationalist you pretended to be... but you are a Jew... And what about the children? What is their identity?” Despite such problems, mistaravim units continued to be formed from time to time, especially as part of military operations targeted at suppressing unrest among the Arab populations of Gaza and in Israel’s neighboring states. In the late 1980s, with the formation of the undercover units in the military and their expansion in the wake of the First Intifada, mistaravim forces were revived as permanent structures.
As the central goal of the Yamas undercover operations is to effectively blend into a crowd or area of operation, the geographical division of decentralized units enables the undercover operatives to learn to become familiar with the specifics of their respective region. Similarly, the use of certain ethnic Arabs, such as Druze, Circassians, and Bedouins, as well as Ethiopians, who can pose as Sudanese and North-African immigrants, makes sense from the perspective of deep-cover tactics, as much as does the use of a make-up artist with experience in the Hollywood motion picture industry. Yamas work is very detailed and sophisticated, oriented at completely immersing oneself into the local culture of Arabs in order to “talk like them, look like them, eat like them, laugh like them, and even smell like them,” as a former operative explains. The mistarav has to take ‘the role of the other’ but should also remain mindful of the objectives of the intervention.
The mistaravim practice reinforces a polarization between police and public, between Israeli and Arab, between those who protect the Israeli state and the Jewish people and those who are out to cause harm and destruction. This polarization is not only the result of military pressures on police work and organization, but is also supported and perpetuated by intra-organizational factors, such as an authoritative leadership style, top-down controls over police discretionary behavior, and strict discipline within the police (Haberfeld and Herzog 2000). Not surprisingly, the combat aspects dominate over the civilian-service functions in the formal training of Israeli Police officers. As a result, the professional police culture is imbedded with notions of crime as warfare, leading police officers to define their position removed from the public and to perceive outside groups, particularly Palestinians, Israeli Arabs, and minorities such as Jews of North-African descent (who are associated with criminal activities) as enemies who pose a “security danger” (Herzog 2000:468; see Ben-Dor, Pedahzur, and Hasisi 2003).
In the case of undercover counter-terrorism policing, the militaristic attitude is amplified by the social and ethnic background of many of the operatives, who are predominantly drawn from low-income socio-economic strata, where an exposure to violence is more common. Moreover, among the Druze communities, from which Yamas undercover operatives are especially recruited, sentiments against other Arabs, especially Palestinians, are high. Druze, who consider themselves Arabs but who are classified as a distinct ethnic group in Israel, are thought of as traitors among other Arab groups because they participate in many of Israel’s institutions, notably the military. More broadly, the unintended consequences of the Yamas interventions and related Israeli policies actions towards the Palestinian and Arab population, which human right groups have often addressed, are not dealt with and are instead redefined as unfortunate necessities from the police viewpoint.
The militaristic nature of Israeli policing styles does not mean that the activities of the National Police and Border Police are tightly controlled by the IDF and its military leaders, or that the military-civilian divide is the predominant dividing line between forces. Instead, organizational dimensions account for the variable degrees of competition and cooperation among units. Most notably, the rivalry that exists among the various Israeli undercover counter-terrorism forces does not always harmonize with a separation between police and military. Unit Gideonim, for instance, was initially conceived as an intelligence-gathering force of the Israeli Police. Yet, it gradually developed counter-terrorist capabilities and was eventually converted into a full-scale counter-terrorism force operating in Israel as well as in the occupied territories, an area it is officially not assigned to, leading to tensions with Judea and Samaria Unit Yamas. Although the Gideonim is supposed to be an intelligence-oriented unit working only within the Israeli borders, it has actually also engaged in counter-terrorism activities in the territories. In terms of jurisdiction, the Gideonim unit also overlaps with the Jerusalem Unit Yamas, and has a bigger budget and is much better staffed than its Yamas counterparts. Therefore, Yamas officers have complained about the relative small budget and low-quality equipment they have to work with. In matters of undercover work, the Border Police units nonetheless claim a sense of professional superiority, because the operatives are “career service men” whose work is a professional choice, whereas the IDF forces mostly consist of young mandatory service soldiers.
Despite the inter-agency conflicts that can occur among police and security agencies with overlapping duties, a shared sense of professionalism and expertise can also facilitate cooperation efforts. Within Israel, intelligence and police agencies at times collaborate despite the fact that intelligence and police activities are functionally differentiated. As Israeli counter-terrorism officials themselves recognize, police work in the area of crime control is “evidence-oriented” in view of a specific case involving a criminal violation, whereas in the case of intelligence work, there is “nothing to enforce,” as information is broadly collected without a specific actionable purpose. Police work, moreover, is carried out within (and for) the law, while intelligence forces operate “outside the law,” not necessarily in an illegal but in an extra-legal context (although the very extra-legality of such work may more readily enable illegal actions to take place and prevent their discovery or prosecution).
A special facilitator of cooperation in the Israeli context exists because of the Jewish commonality in the Israeli nation. The special political and social pressures placed on Israel build, in the words of an Israeli intelligence official, a strong internal cohesion and self-identity as “one family of people who belong together.” Cooperation is further aided by the compulsory military service and the professional experiences many Israelis enjoy from a relatively young age. Intelligence, military, and police officials often have experience in their respective agencies, and thus “more likely know one another” and create cooperation “through personal contacts,” and can cross, with relative ease, over into political roles as well.
Turning to the effects and effectiveness of Yamas undercover operations, the perceived success of the mistaravim tactics among police professionals has brought about that unit operations have been applied in matters of crime control unrelated to terrorism. The Jerusalem Unit, for example, is involved in controlling major crimes such as smuggling operations between Jerusalem and the West Bank. Yamas units also have been involved in criminal cases involving agricultural theft, such as the smuggling of beehives into the West Bank. The capacity of undercover work to move from security to criminal enforcement duties can be attributed to the technical aspect that is involved in such activities. As an undercover commander in the Magav states: “We knew how to blend into a hostile populace... Why couldn’t that knowledge and that level of innovation be used to rid our streets of criminals and drug dealers?”
Undercover Magav units have also engaged in riot control activities within Israeli territory. Mostly these activities are targeted at Arab populations, but, interestingly, undercover strategies have also been adapted to infiltrate demonstrations involving certain Jewish groups. This peculiar undercover practice has been referred to in Hebrew as ‘מסתחרדים’ (phonetic transliteration: ‘mista-haredim’ or ‘mistharedim’), a neologism that, similar to the term mistaravim, contracts the Hebrew for ‘disguise’ and ‘Haredim’ (the plural of Haredi), a term used to refer to ultra-orthodox Jews. The strategy was used by the Israeli Police riot control units of the Yasam (not to be confused with the Yamas) in demonstrations organized in the Haredi community against a gay pride parade in Jerusalem in 2007.
It is not difficult to realize that terrorism issues have special relevance to the state of Israel. Given the country’s unique origins and geo-political development, terrorism and counter-terrorism have moved all aspects of Israeli society as in no other place in the world. The policing of terrorism in Israel surely presents a special case in the world of counter-terrorism. For it can be expected that the nature and development of the state of Israel have brought about strong political characteristics of counter-terrorist police work that stand out among comparable law enforcement organizations in other industrialized democratic states.
In view of the complexity of counter-terrorism in Israel and because of the availability of a unique data set, I have in this chapter chosen to focus on the organization and operations of one special Israeli counter-terrorism force: the Yamas units in the Israeli Border Guard Magav, the combat branch of the Israeli Police. Unlike traditional undercover police tactics aimed at a lengthy probe into a criminal network, the operations of Yamas units typically involve surprise hit-and-run raids targeted at taking out terrorists. I will bring out the unique characteristics of Yamas undercover counter-terrorism in the context of the development of the state of Israel and the country’s long-standing experience with terrorism.
This chapter will show that the bureaucratic development of the Israeli police, in general, and of the policing of terrorism in the undercover Yamas units, in particular, is subject to politicization influences related to Israel’s centralized government structure and the state’s precarious international situation. However, the policing of terrorism in Israel is also shaped by organizational developments involving the adoption of professional standards of police expertise. While these organizational developments of counter-terrorism always remain framed within a broader security context geared towards the protection of the nation-state, they also indicate the importance of rationalization processes that police institutions are subject to regardless of differing political conditions.
Bureaucratization and Politicization
Specifying the model of police bureaucratization to the Israeli case, it will cause no surprise to posit the Israeli police in close conjunction with the distinctive nature and development of the state of Israel. It can be hypothesized that the police function in Israel is highly rationalized in a purposive sense as the nation is modernized in political and economic respects. In consequence, the Israeli police may be expected to be organized as a professional force. Additionally, however, Israel’s specific history can also be expected to have brought about a development of police practices and organizational adaptations that relate to the geo-political circumstances of Israel as a Jewish state within an Arab-dominated Middle East. Specifically, periods of upheaval, whether sudden and abrupt or of a more enduring nature, will reveal that the autonomy of Israeli policing also depends on the degree to which the police are controlled by government authorities.
The measure of effective political control on the police is determined by the degree of politicization and centralization of society and the continuity of political power (Gamson and Yuchtman 1977). The Israeli police plays a significant political role but is also subject to a professional police subculture. In terms of the bureaucratization theory, it is therefore important to consider that Israeli police institutions (as other state institutions) will be characterized by a relatively high degree of politicization, because the polity in Israel is not only centralized but also dominant. In this sense, the Israeli police is more than usual connected to the state’s central government. Besides the political dependency of the Israeli police, however, there will also be organizational developments that shape police work on the basis of professional standards. Yet, because of Israel’s geo-political conditions, the bureaucratization tendencies of the police will remain framed within a broader orientation towards the protection of the state.
Policing Israel
The organization of the Israeli police is historically based on the system of the British Mandate of Palestine that existed from 1922 to 1948. Upon the foundation of the state of Israel, the unitary structure of the British system was maintained in the form of an Israeli National Police with a central police headquarters in Jerusalem and regional districts and subdistricts across the territory. The police function in Israel includes crime control, peacekeeping, service functions, traffic control, and internal security. In the course of its history, the Israeli police adjusted in organizational and functional respects to the changing conditions of Israel’s precarious international situation. In 1953, the Border Guard or Magav was set up as a quasi-military gendarmerie force within the Israeli Police in order to combat infiltrators and patrol Israel’s borders. Following the Six Day War of 1967, the expanded territory under Israeli control brought about an expansion of police to the eastern part of Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria (the West Bank), Gaza, Northern Sinai, and the Golan Heights. In the West Bank, police sub-districts were set up that, under military command, were staffed by Israeli and local Arab officers.
Following the Yom Kippur War of 1973, responsibility for internal security within Israel was handed over to the Israeli National Police. In the late 1980s, the Palestinian uprising now known as the First Intifada led to reinforcements of the Israeli police in Jerusalem and other main areas of unrest. The Border Guard and the Civil Guard were then enlisted in the execution of regular police tasks. But when in the early 1990s the Intifada intensified and terrorist bombings increased, the Israeli Police again transferred resources from crime control tasks to internal security functions. The signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 led to the establishment of a sixth Police District for Judea and Samaria. The IDF redeployment in the West Bank transferred internal security duties in the Lakhish Sub-District to the Israeli Police. Currently, the Israeli Police oversees some 25,000 officers, spread over 6 districts, 10 sub-districts, and about 80 police stations. The Israel Police is commanded by a Commissioner of Police, who reports directly to the Minister of Public Security.
The undercover counter-terrorism units of the Yamas (also: Ya’mas; Hebrew: ימ"ס) are organized within the Border Guard Magav. An acronym for Mishmar Ha-Gvul (Hebrew for ‘Frontier Guard’), the Magav is in charge of matters of internal security and terrorism (Brewer et al. 1988). Magav units are employed in main areas of unrest, mainly in Arab-populated areas, near the Israeli state borders, in Jerusalem, and in the West Bank and the Gaza strip. Since the Israeli disengagement from Gaza in 2005, Border Police and IDF forces have withdrawn from the territory now under Palestinian control, but both military and Magav forces still control the Gaza-Israeli border and have occasionally also undertaken operations in Gaza. The Border Guard consists of professional police officers and soldiers redirected from the IDF, some of them as part of the compulsory military service. All Jewish Israeli citizens over the age of 18 are subject to a mandatory service (three years for males, and 18 to 21 months for females).
Since the mid 1970s, both military and civilian forces in Israel have organized counter-terrorism units. In 1974, a civilian counter-terrorism unit was created in the Magav. Later named Unit Yamam, this force became a specialized counter-terror and hostage rescue unit, but it also performs so-called SWAT (special weapons and tactics) duties and engages in undercover police work. Following the outbreak of the Intifada in 1987, several more undercover counter-terrorism units were formed in the IDF, in the Magav, and, in the mid-1990s, in the Israeli Police as well. Besides Unit Yamam, the Magav presently comprises three additional counter-terrorism units: the Matilan, specialized in intelligence gathering and infiltrations interception; the Yamag, a rapid deployment unit for crime and terrorism; and the Yamas, which is in charge of undercover counter-terrorism operations.
Israel Undercover: The Organization of the Yamas
The Yamas units in the Magav are among a group of elite Israeli undercover forces that were originally developed in the military. When the First Intifada broke out in 1987, the IDF created two undercover units: the Sayeret Shimshon unit in the Gaza Strip, and Sayeret Duvdevan (Unit 217) in the West Bank. In 1990, the first Yamas units were established for the same two territories: the Gaza Strip Unit Yamas and the Judea and Samaria Unit Yamas. Both units were formed to deal with terrorist activities coming from these predominantly Palestinian regions, whereby the Gaza strip was of special significance because it was also home to some 8,000 Jewish settlers.
The creation of a third Yamas unit for Israel’s capital city, the Jerusalem Unit Yamas, dates back to 1992, when the Intifada had begun to extend its reach. The unit was initially established as a so-called Samag or reconnaissance force that is oriented at gathering actionable intelligence, but it became an undercover unit in 1995. The special emphasis in the unit’s work is on the eastern (Arab-dominated) side of Jerusalem, which is seen as a particularly dangerous platform for terrorist attacks given the proximity to the western (largely Jewish) parts of the city. The three Yamas units receive the same type of training and equipment, but they lack a unified command. The reason for this decentralized approach is that each relevant region contains Arab populations with their own specific Arabic dialects, customs, and clans, so that each unit has its own unique challenges to effectively infiltrate local culture.
By the very nature of the work undercover counter-terrorism units are involved in, details about the establishment and existence of such units are at times carefully guarded. The Yamas units were classified until August 26, 1992, when an undercover operative was accidentally killed by friendly fire. A day after the incident, a Magav commander appeared on Israeli television to confirm the existence of a unit whose members “dressed as Arabs” and operated “routinely, almost every evening” in the administered territories (quoted in Middle East Watch 1993). In the early 1990s, similar undercover units were also exposed in the Israeli media. In 1991, an IDF officer allowed the existence of military undercover units to be disclosed on Israeli television. A few weeks later, a commander in the Border Police in a radio interview confirmed the deployment of Magav undercover units in the territories and in eastern Jerusalem. In 1994, the undercover units of the Border Police were officially disclosed.
Shortly after the creation of the Jerusalem Unit Yamas, the Israeli Police set up its own undercover force, the Unit Gideonim. At that time, then, there were no less than six counter-terrorist units for three areas: Sayeret Shimshon and Gaza Strip Unit Yamas in Gaza; Sayeret Duvdevan and Judea and Samaria Unit Yamas in the West Bank; and Unit Gideonim and Jerusalem Unit Yamas in Israel’s capital city. In 1994, following the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip, the IDF Unit Shimshon was disbanded, and the Gaza Strip Unit Yamas was relocated in another Magav force. In that period also, after the Oslo Accords of 1993 had established the contours of a Palestinian right of self-governance in Gaza and the West Bank, Magav forces even cooperated with the Palestinian Police Force to conduct joint patrols of areas that were under Israeli-Palestinian mandate (Geva, Herzog, and Haberfeld 2004:1132). However, as the Oslo Accords gradually collapsed in the wake of continued suicide bombings and the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000, all Palestinian-Israeli security collaborations were suspended.
In 2001, the Yamas unit in the Gaza Strip was rebuilt as a separate unit and reinforced. No public information is available on the Gaza Unit’s status since the 2005 disengagement. The official website of the Israeli Police still lists the Gaza territory among the Border Guard’s responsibilities. Since the Hamas (an organization whose charter calls for the destruction of the state of Israel) took control of Gaza in June 2007, it is more than likely that the Border Police and the IDF still maintain a level of operational readiness towards the region. This state of preparedness could be operationalized when on December 27, 2008, Israel undertook a military campaign against Hamas that lasted until January 21, 2009, with continued armed hostilities regularly taking place between Hamas and Israeli forces since then.
Yamas units operate as para-military forces and in their covert appearance resemble military special forces rather than a civilian police unit. The Border Police is under the command of the IDF when they operate in the territories. And, until 1991, the units were even financed by the IDF. Since then, however, the Yamas is self-sufficient in terms of budget and equipment. Although similar to IDF Unit 217 with respect to tactics, the Yamas is distinct in several respects. Whereas most members of Unit 217 are Jewish, the Yamas units predominantly include Arab minorities who have Arabic as their native language. Also, while most members of Unit 217 are mandatory service soldiers, the Yamas operatives have completed their mandatory service. After a limited number of years in the force, once the operatives’ faces may have become too familiar to the people in the communities in which they operate covertly, the officers are either shifted to a different position in the units that involves no undercover work (e.g., snipers) or are moved to another Magav unit.
The recruitment and training programs for the Yamas are very selective. Only about 20%-30% of all applicants to the undercover units are said to eventually become operatives. Based on information provided by Magav command, the initial training involves a very severe seven-day trial period which is particularly oriented at instilling a strong cohesion among the trainees, which is described as ‘gibush,’ a Hebrew term that denotes cohesion and that is especially used in education-related settings but also in political parties, informal groups, and military units (see Katriel and Nesher 1986). Both physical challenges and mental endurance requirements are central to the training. The complete training period lasts one year and includes half a year of basic and advanced infantry training in the Magav or the IDF, two months additional training in a selected unit, and four months of specialized counter-terrorism and undercover training. Training includes instruction in martial arts, Arabic language skills, the use of specialized weaponry (including small Uzis suitable for undercover work), and blending-in exercises in friendly villages and, gradually, in more hostile Arab villages in Israel, in addition to special training programs for snipers, drivers, paramedics, and other specialized functions. Self-control and physical as well as mental stamina are emphasized among the necessary qualities to join the units. In the words of a commander, the candidates need “the correct intuition, courage, and self-confidence. We’re not looking for Rambos; we need people with discipline.”
Members of the Yamas are at least 24 years of age, but typically not much older than 30, and usually unmarried. Since 2003, the units have experimented with integrating a small number of females, but men have always made up the vast majority of operatives. In the world of Yamas undercover operations oriented at gathering intelligence and conducting hit-and-run raids, gender is less relevant as male operatives can dress up as females (aided by the Arab customs of the hijab and burqa).
In terms of its operational objectives, the Yamas is involved in undercover interventions and in intelligence work preparatory to such interventions by Yamas or other undercover forces in the police or military. The units primarily engage in two kinds of interventions. In direct actions, operatives pinpoint terrorists on the basis of intelligence provided by police or military forces. Additionally, undercover operatives infiltrate in crowd control situations and riots, where they seek to seize the leaders and take out armed terrorists. In both types of activities, the Yamas operatives operate covertly, dressed in clothing and otherwise acting in a manner that blends with the local culture. Once they have drawn their weapons and revealed their true nature, they typically put on a black ski mask to cover their faces and/or a baseball cap with the Hebrew word for police so that accompanying uniformed forces can recognize them. Once a target is taken out and armed officers have arrived onto the scene, the Yamas operatives (and their targets in the case of a live capture or snatch-and-grab) quickly disappear in a military vehicle or an unmarked white van.
The Dynamics of Yamas Counter-Terrorism
Modern police organizations are subject to a bureaucratization process that is conditional on societal, especially political, conditions which may lead police agencies to be drawn more closely to the political dictates of their governments. In the case of the Israeli police, and the Yamas in particular, these dual forces are reflected in a number of ways.
Policing National Security
The intimate relation between policing and politics in the Israeli context is most fundamentally revealed in the organization of the police. Organizationally, the political dependency of the Israeli police is reflected in the fact that the Police Commissioner is placed under direct authority of the Minister of Public Security, who represents the government. Israel’s police is thus not organizationally autonomous but subject to control from a highly centralized government (Gamson and Yuchtman 1977). In consequence, the Israeli police lacks many of the distinctive subcultural traits that police institutions in otherwise comparable nations have obtained. The internal control structure in the Israeli police is very tight, and police unions do not exist. Functionally, Israeli police tasks are not only oriented at criminal and service duties but also comprise public security functions directed at protecting the Israeli state. Within the borders of Israel, the security functions of the police are autonomously conducted, and in the territories they are executed under military command. In the case of the Yamas, the security functions in undercover work are dominant.
In consequence of the political dependence of the Israeli police, its relation with the military is an intimate one. In the Israeli context, police and military institutions and functions are interwoven to a considerable degree, especially in areas of work, such as counter-terrorism, that relate more closely to national security concerns. A military style, hierarchical organization, and centralization have been characteristic of the Israeli Police from the start (Herzog 2001). Israel’s non-liberal democracy contributed to the use of military force and extreme security measures (Ben-Dor, Pedahzur, and Hasisi 2003). The Palestinian conflict has additionally shaped the militaristic style of the Israeli police and the definition of police functions in terms of national security, even when on strategic grounds alone this approach has not always proven to be efficient (Pedahzur 2009).
The predominance of military security functions over civilian police tasks is further revealed in the very establishment of Israel’s undercover counter-terrorism units. As mentioned, the first units were set up in the IDF rather than in the National Police or the Border Guard. The major impetus for the formation of the units came from former Israeli Prime Minister and current Minister of Defense Ehud Barak, who at the time was an IDF Major General (1987-1991) and Chief of Staff (1991-1995). Barak had personal experience with undercover operations in April 1973, when he was part of the Sayeret Matkal, a specialized military reconnaissance and counterterrorism team, involved in the killings of PLO members in Lebanon. Part of the so-called ‘Operation Wrath of God,’ the killings took place in retaliation for the 1972 massacre at the Munich Olympic Games. Barak had in the operation masqueraded as a female. Once the military undercover units were established under Barak’s leadership, the Border Police and Israeli National Police quickly followed with their own elite units.
In the execution of undercover activities, the Yamas typically cooperate with other police and military agencies. Military forces and specialized intelligence agencies, specifically the Shin Bet, are most often relied upon to gather the necessary intelligence for Yamas interventions. But Yamas units, in turn, also gather their own intelligence or disseminate it to other agencies. Unlike the collection of actionable intelligence in routine police work for particular criminal cases, intelligence work conducted by the Yamas is not restricted to a particular case, but involves a more routinized information-gathering process, albeit with a view towards action on the part of police or military forces.
The military character of policing in Israel is not a simple unilinear development. In the 1990s, the Israeli police experienced a trend of demilitarization, involving a shift from a security to a crime control focus (Herzog 2001). While both crime and security functions have always been part of the Israeli police mandate, the balance shifted due to a rise in ordinary crimes, such as drug offenses and crime problems related to property and public safety. Local police stations received more autonomy in dealing with such problems, while the image, salary, and working conditions of the civilian police improved, and more women joined the police. Such developments gave the police a more distinct place separate from the military, but ironically also devalued the role of the police in society. In status and prestige, members of the Israeli police are typically held in much lower standing than IDF soldiers (Brewer et al. 1988).
Looking at the implications of the dual police focus on security as well as crime, not much information is available about the nature and extent of Yamas operations. According to a commander, the units are engaged in “several operations per week,” confirming public sources that Yamas operations take place on an almost daily basis. The undercover operations conducted in a recent year by Border Guard, military, and intelligence forces are said to be “100% successful.” But reliable information on the effects of the interventions is difficult to obtain. On only rare and isolated occasions has the Yamas been identified in media and other sources concerning a specific operation. Among the isolated cases of undercover interventions in which the Yamas has publicly been identified is intelligence work during the late 1990s against Yahya Ayyash, one of the chief bomb-makers in Hamas (Katz 2002:186-189). More recently, in the spring of 2007, the Yamas took part in a hit-and-run intervention, killing three members of the Islamic Jihad, including the master-mind behind a suicide bombing in February of that year, in the West Bank city of Jenin.
Providing a more general overview, Yamas units had by 1994 reportedly captured some 70 top members of the Hamas and hundreds of low-level operatives. According to a Magav commander speaking in the media, Border Police units had in 1998 carried out some 770 operations in Judea and Samaria, about one third of which were conducted by undercover units, leading to 180 arrests. By 2007, some 1,500 operations had, according to an unidentified Yamas Unit commander, been conducted by the Yamas since the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000.
The Professionalism of Undercover Counter-Terrorism
Despite the politicization processes on Israeli policing, organizational developments are also at work to account for some of the characteristics of Israel’s counter-terrorism police units. Most noticeable is the strongly expressed sense of commitment to standards of professionalism that is shared among unit operatives and their commanders. As a former intelligence agent explained, security work in the Israeli context always “retains a professional character” because the intelligence community is not subject to the specific changes that take place in the party-political landscape with every election. Among security officials, the expertise of leadership and the professional roles associated with intelligence activities are emphasized to the extent that intelligence information is conceived of as being produced “independently” for the benefit of the political leaders, who are thought of as “customers” or “consumers.” Yamas command likewise stresses that “the unit is independent” and that any decision to engage in an intervention is always “based on professional criteria.”
Though involving extreme measures, undercover counter-terrorism interventions are conceived of by participating police as pro-active measures to prevent attacks by terrorists. As a commander explains, the undercover units “deploy to intercept them before they hit us” (quoted in Katz 2005:21). Also emphasized is the ideal of counter-terrorism work to take out terrorists without hurting any civilians and do everything possible to make sure the interventions are as “clean as possible... to catch the bad guy but not hurt civilians.” A mission that upon its initiation turns out to be too dangerous will be called off, for, in the words of a unit commander, should an operative’s true identity be revealed during an investigation, “they would tear him apart. It’s very dangerous and very problematic.”
The standards of conduct in the Yamas units are reported to be very high, and failure in a mission is said to lead to immediate dismissal from the unit. A commander justifies the high standard by reference to the dangers involved: “A small mistake could result in the death of a comrade...a friend, or someone who is unarmed.” Yet, although the seriousness of the job and the potential dangers involved in the operations are readily apparent to the unit members, there is also a sense of excitement involved in choosing a career in undercover counter-terrorism. In the words of a Yamas operative, the undercover operatives puts on an act as in “reality TV” and is “looking for a challenge... for risk... for self-expression.” Another undercover operative speaks of the “exultation” he felt after his first killing in the field. An accomplished mission is seen by unit operatives as “the biggest satisfaction there is.” Professional mistakes, in contrast, lead to negative feelings. An undercover officer said he felt “lousy” after he had mistakenly killed a person who, acting eccentrically, turned out to be a psychiatric patient who had escaped from an asylum.
In line with professional standards oriented at efficient policing, a strong emphasis is placed in Yamas activities on knowing the operational targets very intimately and studying and submerging oneself in their culture. This deep-cover role is referred to in Hebrew as ‘mistaravim’ (also: mista’arvim or mista’aravim). The central term appearing in the full name of the Yamas, the expression mistaravim (Hebrew: מסתערבים) is the plural form of a neologism that combines the Hebrew terms for ‘disguise’ and ‘Arab’ (Lockard 2002:61). Most sources translate the full name of the Yamas, Yehida Mishtartit Mistaravim, as ‘Counter-Terror Undercover Unit,’ but the Hebrew phrase is more literally to be translated as ‘Unit Undercover Disguised-as-Arabs.’ Mistaravim refers to the skill to appear to be Arab in every possible way, including proficiency in the Arabic language and its dialects, knowledge of the Muslim religion, the Koran, specific ways of dressing and behaving, and an understanding of every relevant aspect of local Arab cultures. The term mistaravim is so central to Israeli undercover practices in the police and the military that the units are sometimes referred to more generically as the mistaravim, under which name they are also well known among Israelis and local Arab and Palestinian populations as well as by critics of Israel’s policies in the territories.
Mistaravim practices have a long history. In the late 1990s it was revealed that the Shin Bet had during the 1950s organized a small group of some ten to twelve mistaravim operatives in order to gather intelligence in Arab villages. The experiment was viewed an error and terminated in 1959, when some operatives had married Arab women and had children with them. Under these conditions, as the founder and commander of the unit later explained, problems arose as operatives had to reveal the truth to their wife and children: “Not only are you not the Arab nationalist you pretended to be... but you are a Jew... And what about the children? What is their identity?” Despite such problems, mistaravim units continued to be formed from time to time, especially as part of military operations targeted at suppressing unrest among the Arab populations of Gaza and in Israel’s neighboring states. In the late 1980s, with the formation of the undercover units in the military and their expansion in the wake of the First Intifada, mistaravim forces were revived as permanent structures.
As the central goal of the Yamas undercover operations is to effectively blend into a crowd or area of operation, the geographical division of decentralized units enables the undercover operatives to learn to become familiar with the specifics of their respective region. Similarly, the use of certain ethnic Arabs, such as Druze, Circassians, and Bedouins, as well as Ethiopians, who can pose as Sudanese and North-African immigrants, makes sense from the perspective of deep-cover tactics, as much as does the use of a make-up artist with experience in the Hollywood motion picture industry. Yamas work is very detailed and sophisticated, oriented at completely immersing oneself into the local culture of Arabs in order to “talk like them, look like them, eat like them, laugh like them, and even smell like them,” as a former operative explains. The mistarav has to take ‘the role of the other’ but should also remain mindful of the objectives of the intervention.
The mistaravim practice reinforces a polarization between police and public, between Israeli and Arab, between those who protect the Israeli state and the Jewish people and those who are out to cause harm and destruction. This polarization is not only the result of military pressures on police work and organization, but is also supported and perpetuated by intra-organizational factors, such as an authoritative leadership style, top-down controls over police discretionary behavior, and strict discipline within the police (Haberfeld and Herzog 2000). Not surprisingly, the combat aspects dominate over the civilian-service functions in the formal training of Israeli Police officers. As a result, the professional police culture is imbedded with notions of crime as warfare, leading police officers to define their position removed from the public and to perceive outside groups, particularly Palestinians, Israeli Arabs, and minorities such as Jews of North-African descent (who are associated with criminal activities) as enemies who pose a “security danger” (Herzog 2000:468; see Ben-Dor, Pedahzur, and Hasisi 2003).
In the case of undercover counter-terrorism policing, the militaristic attitude is amplified by the social and ethnic background of many of the operatives, who are predominantly drawn from low-income socio-economic strata, where an exposure to violence is more common. Moreover, among the Druze communities, from which Yamas undercover operatives are especially recruited, sentiments against other Arabs, especially Palestinians, are high. Druze, who consider themselves Arabs but who are classified as a distinct ethnic group in Israel, are thought of as traitors among other Arab groups because they participate in many of Israel’s institutions, notably the military. More broadly, the unintended consequences of the Yamas interventions and related Israeli policies actions towards the Palestinian and Arab population, which human right groups have often addressed, are not dealt with and are instead redefined as unfortunate necessities from the police viewpoint.
The militaristic nature of Israeli policing styles does not mean that the activities of the National Police and Border Police are tightly controlled by the IDF and its military leaders, or that the military-civilian divide is the predominant dividing line between forces. Instead, organizational dimensions account for the variable degrees of competition and cooperation among units. Most notably, the rivalry that exists among the various Israeli undercover counter-terrorism forces does not always harmonize with a separation between police and military. Unit Gideonim, for instance, was initially conceived as an intelligence-gathering force of the Israeli Police. Yet, it gradually developed counter-terrorist capabilities and was eventually converted into a full-scale counter-terrorism force operating in Israel as well as in the occupied territories, an area it is officially not assigned to, leading to tensions with Judea and Samaria Unit Yamas. Although the Gideonim is supposed to be an intelligence-oriented unit working only within the Israeli borders, it has actually also engaged in counter-terrorism activities in the territories. In terms of jurisdiction, the Gideonim unit also overlaps with the Jerusalem Unit Yamas, and has a bigger budget and is much better staffed than its Yamas counterparts. Therefore, Yamas officers have complained about the relative small budget and low-quality equipment they have to work with. In matters of undercover work, the Border Police units nonetheless claim a sense of professional superiority, because the operatives are “career service men” whose work is a professional choice, whereas the IDF forces mostly consist of young mandatory service soldiers.
Despite the inter-agency conflicts that can occur among police and security agencies with overlapping duties, a shared sense of professionalism and expertise can also facilitate cooperation efforts. Within Israel, intelligence and police agencies at times collaborate despite the fact that intelligence and police activities are functionally differentiated. As Israeli counter-terrorism officials themselves recognize, police work in the area of crime control is “evidence-oriented” in view of a specific case involving a criminal violation, whereas in the case of intelligence work, there is “nothing to enforce,” as information is broadly collected without a specific actionable purpose. Police work, moreover, is carried out within (and for) the law, while intelligence forces operate “outside the law,” not necessarily in an illegal but in an extra-legal context (although the very extra-legality of such work may more readily enable illegal actions to take place and prevent their discovery or prosecution).
A special facilitator of cooperation in the Israeli context exists because of the Jewish commonality in the Israeli nation. The special political and social pressures placed on Israel build, in the words of an Israeli intelligence official, a strong internal cohesion and self-identity as “one family of people who belong together.” Cooperation is further aided by the compulsory military service and the professional experiences many Israelis enjoy from a relatively young age. Intelligence, military, and police officials often have experience in their respective agencies, and thus “more likely know one another” and create cooperation “through personal contacts,” and can cross, with relative ease, over into political roles as well.
Turning to the effects and effectiveness of Yamas undercover operations, the perceived success of the mistaravim tactics among police professionals has brought about that unit operations have been applied in matters of crime control unrelated to terrorism. The Jerusalem Unit, for example, is involved in controlling major crimes such as smuggling operations between Jerusalem and the West Bank. Yamas units also have been involved in criminal cases involving agricultural theft, such as the smuggling of beehives into the West Bank. The capacity of undercover work to move from security to criminal enforcement duties can be attributed to the technical aspect that is involved in such activities. As an undercover commander in the Magav states: “We knew how to blend into a hostile populace... Why couldn’t that knowledge and that level of innovation be used to rid our streets of criminals and drug dealers?”
Undercover Magav units have also engaged in riot control activities within Israeli territory. Mostly these activities are targeted at Arab populations, but, interestingly, undercover strategies have also been adapted to infiltrate demonstrations involving certain Jewish groups. This peculiar undercover practice has been referred to in Hebrew as ‘מסתחרדים’ (phonetic transliteration: ‘mista-haredim’ or ‘mistharedim’), a neologism that, similar to the term mistaravim, contracts the Hebrew for ‘disguise’ and ‘Haredim’ (the plural of Haredi), a term used to refer to ultra-orthodox Jews. The strategy was used by the Israeli Police riot control units of the Yasam (not to be confused with the Yamas) in demonstrations organized in the Haredi community against a gay pride parade in Jerusalem in 2007.
Global Counter-Terrorism
In the present era of global concerns over terrorism and counter-terrorism, it is more than interesting to note that the mutual recognition of professional responsibilities among counter-terrorism experts also crosses national borders. In the case of Israel’s counter-terrorism police, cooperation not only takes place because much of the weaponry used by the Yamas is bought from the United States and Germany, but also because certain elements of Israel’s counter-terrorism strategies have found their way into the training of counter-terrorist forces across the world. In matters of terrorism, in particular, Israeli officials share their expertise with counterparts abroad through seminars and workshops organized both in Israel as well as in host countries. Police officials from across the world additionally take part in international police and military exchange programs arranged by private groups, such as the Anti-Defamation League and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs.
Crossing the boundaries of the police profession, there are indications that strategies similar to the ones used by mistaravim units have been suggested to the U.S. military in support of its counter-insurgency role in Iraq. An Israeli report obtained by a Pentagon official from a U.S. Army officer comments favorably on the Israeli experience with mistaravim tactics and suggests their use for the U.S. Army and Marines. The award-winning investigative journalist and author Seymour Hersh has reported that U.S. special forces operating in Iraq shortly after the invasion in 2003 were relying on advice from Israeli military intelligence officers who urged the American forces to maintain a network of informants and emulate Israel’s mistaravim tactics. Hersh has also written that Israeli operatives have been training Kurds in Iraq in mistaravim tactics in order to infiltrate Shiite and Sunni insurgent groups and help form a pro-Israeli Kurdish state.
Transfer of police technology across national borders particularly takes place through the private security industry. In the context of this chapter, mention can be made of IMS Security, a Los Angeles-based company that offers “Israeli style security services and anti-terrorist training.” An abbreviation of ‘Israeli Military Specialists,’ IMS offers body guard services for corporate leaders, foreign diplomats, and Hollywood celebrities, and also organizes counter-terrorism training, including an ‘Israeli Style Terrorist Warrant Course’ that is modeled “after Israel’s famed Duvdevan and Yamas Units.” In 2005, IMS organized such a five-day counter-terrorist training at an FBI firing range in the state of Washington, attended by representatives of local police, the National Guard, and U.S. Customs. It is obviously difficult to determine if and to what extent the company can make good on its claims, but it is to be noted that IMS was founded in 2000 by a then 24-year old former member of the Israeli military with three years of experience in an IDF undercover counter-terrorism unit. Similarly, the Israeli company Baguera-Israël, which has headquarters in Israel and in the United States, boasts to have “trained, advised, and collaborated with Israel’s most elite special forces, both military and police, such as the police covert operational counter terror unit the Yamas.” And week-long workshops with Israeli counter-terrorism experts, including briefings with the Yamas, have recently been organized by at least two U.S.-based private security companies. It cannot be determined, however, if the transfer of expertise on counter-terrorism from Israel has operational impact.
Conclusion
As I have argued throughout this book, the pacification of society is a necessary condition for the bureaucratization of the police function. The condition of pacification is a key to understanding the character of policing in Israel, including undercover counter-terrorism activities. Because of the sense of Israel having been in a permanent state of emergency since the creation of the state in 1948 and, even more intensely, during moments of great international tension and hostility, such as the Six Day and Yom Kippur Wars and the two Intifadas. Police institutions in Israel —not least of all in the area of counter-terrorism— are inevitably subject to strong politicization pressures. In the case of the Yamas operations, more specifically, the mistaravim practices function as an important tool in the Israeli control of Palestinian-claimed territories. From an organizational viewpoint, however, it is to be noted that within the undercover units a distinct sense of professionalism and efficiency is also observed.
In sum, the bureaucratization of the Yamas is constrained within the political context of the Israeli nation-state. The mistaravim practices, especially in the territories, are planned and implemented on the basis of efficiency standards from the police point of view, but they are by some groups, both within and outside Israel, judged as lacking in terms of their civil and human rights implications.
The dual influences of contextual and organizational developments on counter-terrorism policing are not unique to the Israeli case. As the analyses of other cases in this book show, police organizations across the world have in the post-9/11 era generally experienced attempts by their respective governments to have policing objectives, especially in matters of counter-terrorism, be aligned more closely with political directives of national security. Yet, what is distinct about the Israeli experience is that the bureaucratization of Israel’s civilian police forces has historically been hindered by the non-liberal nature of Israeli democracy, the continually strained international situation with the surrounding Arab nations, and the resulting sense of a permanent state of emergency. In this sense, the Israeli counter-terrorism experience exhibits characteristics that in other societies are observed only during periods of extreme unrest, such as war. In this respect, contemporary Iraq and Afghanistan provide interesting comparative cases of research.
In the present era of global concerns over terrorism and counter-terrorism, it is more than interesting to note that the mutual recognition of professional responsibilities among counter-terrorism experts also crosses national borders. In the case of Israel’s counter-terrorism police, cooperation not only takes place because much of the weaponry used by the Yamas is bought from the United States and Germany, but also because certain elements of Israel’s counter-terrorism strategies have found their way into the training of counter-terrorist forces across the world. In matters of terrorism, in particular, Israeli officials share their expertise with counterparts abroad through seminars and workshops organized both in Israel as well as in host countries. Police officials from across the world additionally take part in international police and military exchange programs arranged by private groups, such as the Anti-Defamation League and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs.
Crossing the boundaries of the police profession, there are indications that strategies similar to the ones used by mistaravim units have been suggested to the U.S. military in support of its counter-insurgency role in Iraq. An Israeli report obtained by a Pentagon official from a U.S. Army officer comments favorably on the Israeli experience with mistaravim tactics and suggests their use for the U.S. Army and Marines. The award-winning investigative journalist and author Seymour Hersh has reported that U.S. special forces operating in Iraq shortly after the invasion in 2003 were relying on advice from Israeli military intelligence officers who urged the American forces to maintain a network of informants and emulate Israel’s mistaravim tactics. Hersh has also written that Israeli operatives have been training Kurds in Iraq in mistaravim tactics in order to infiltrate Shiite and Sunni insurgent groups and help form a pro-Israeli Kurdish state.
Transfer of police technology across national borders particularly takes place through the private security industry. In the context of this chapter, mention can be made of IMS Security, a Los Angeles-based company that offers “Israeli style security services and anti-terrorist training.” An abbreviation of ‘Israeli Military Specialists,’ IMS offers body guard services for corporate leaders, foreign diplomats, and Hollywood celebrities, and also organizes counter-terrorism training, including an ‘Israeli Style Terrorist Warrant Course’ that is modeled “after Israel’s famed Duvdevan and Yamas Units.” In 2005, IMS organized such a five-day counter-terrorist training at an FBI firing range in the state of Washington, attended by representatives of local police, the National Guard, and U.S. Customs. It is obviously difficult to determine if and to what extent the company can make good on its claims, but it is to be noted that IMS was founded in 2000 by a then 24-year old former member of the Israeli military with three years of experience in an IDF undercover counter-terrorism unit. Similarly, the Israeli company Baguera-Israël, which has headquarters in Israel and in the United States, boasts to have “trained, advised, and collaborated with Israel’s most elite special forces, both military and police, such as the police covert operational counter terror unit the Yamas.” And week-long workshops with Israeli counter-terrorism experts, including briefings with the Yamas, have recently been organized by at least two U.S.-based private security companies. It cannot be determined, however, if the transfer of expertise on counter-terrorism from Israel has operational impact.
Conclusion
As I have argued throughout this book, the pacification of society is a necessary condition for the bureaucratization of the police function. The condition of pacification is a key to understanding the character of policing in Israel, including undercover counter-terrorism activities. Because of the sense of Israel having been in a permanent state of emergency since the creation of the state in 1948 and, even more intensely, during moments of great international tension and hostility, such as the Six Day and Yom Kippur Wars and the two Intifadas. Police institutions in Israel —not least of all in the area of counter-terrorism— are inevitably subject to strong politicization pressures. In the case of the Yamas operations, more specifically, the mistaravim practices function as an important tool in the Israeli control of Palestinian-claimed territories. From an organizational viewpoint, however, it is to be noted that within the undercover units a distinct sense of professionalism and efficiency is also observed.
In sum, the bureaucratization of the Yamas is constrained within the political context of the Israeli nation-state. The mistaravim practices, especially in the territories, are planned and implemented on the basis of efficiency standards from the police point of view, but they are by some groups, both within and outside Israel, judged as lacking in terms of their civil and human rights implications.
The dual influences of contextual and organizational developments on counter-terrorism policing are not unique to the Israeli case. As the analyses of other cases in this book show, police organizations across the world have in the post-9/11 era generally experienced attempts by their respective governments to have policing objectives, especially in matters of counter-terrorism, be aligned more closely with political directives of national security. Yet, what is distinct about the Israeli experience is that the bureaucratization of Israel’s civilian police forces has historically been hindered by the non-liberal nature of Israeli democracy, the continually strained international situation with the surrounding Arab nations, and the resulting sense of a permanent state of emergency. In this sense, the Israeli counter-terrorism experience exhibits characteristics that in other societies are observed only during periods of extreme unrest, such as war. In this respect, contemporary Iraq and Afghanistan provide interesting comparative cases of research.
Notes to Chapter 9
Analysis in this chapter relies on archival sources as well as ethnographic data obtained during a research visit in Israel, which included a stay with a Yamas unit and meetings with officials in the Magav, the Israeli National Police, and other Israeli security agencies. All identifying data, including the identity of counter-terrorism officials and the location and identity of the Yamas unit I visited, are withheld in this study. Ethnographic data are cited in double quotation marks (not followed by a bibliographical reference). I am grateful to Joe Lockard, Gal Soltz, and Amit and Vered Almor for help in translating Hebrew sources.
See the PDF copy of the book for additional notes.
